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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
  
                      
 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 This appeal arises from a § 1983 action brought by 
Blanche Road Associates (Blanche Road) and its general partner, 
Blanche Road Corporation, against Bensalem Township and several 
of its officials and employees.  The appeal raises several 
issues, including whether the district court abused its 
discretion after the first trial by granting a new trial and 
whether the judge erred by failing to recuse himself in the 
second trial.  We conclude, however, that the dispositive issue 
is whether, during the second trial, the district court properly 
granted defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law.  
Because we find that the court erred in granting this motion, we 
will reverse and remand this action for yet another trial.   
 I. 
 Adam and Blanche Talacki purchased a 52-acre tract of 
undeveloped land in Bensalem Township in 1967.  A subdivision and 
land development plan, dividing the land into 32 lots, was 
approved by the Township and recorded in 1972.  In addition, the 
Talackis and the Township entered into a one-year subdivision 
agreement which required the Talackis to complete certain 
improvements, including roads, curbs, and a drainage system, by 
June 28, 1973.  These improvements were substantially completed. 
 In 1982, Bensalem Township enacted a subdivision and 
land development ordinance to assist orderly, efficient and 
  
integrated development of land.  This ordinance was amended on 
June 15, 1987, with the addition of impact fees, based on the 
number of dwelling units or on the square footage of commercial 
buildings to be constructed on a developed lot.  Township 
regulation of development and construction was expanded again on 
July 27, 1987, by enactment of Ordinance 371, which adopted most 
of the Building Officials & Code Administrators, International, 
Inc. ("BOCA") National Building Code.  Included in this July 
ordinance was a Code Appeals Board to hear appeals from code 
violations. 
 In 1986, the Talackis and Walter and Margaret Czekay 
decided to develop an industrial park on the 23 undeveloped lots 
in the subdivision.  They formed Blanche Road Corporation, and, 
with Blanche Road Corporation as the general partner and the 
Talackis and Czekays as limited partners, they formed Blanche 
Road Associates, a Pennsylvania limited partnership.  Blanche 
Road Associates began operations by purchasing one lot from the 
Talackis and entering into an option agreement with them to 
purchase any or all of the remaining lots over the next four 
years.  The Talackis and Czekays planned to build on the lots 
sequentially, by investing the proceeds from the sale or lease of 
one developed lot in the development of the next lot, until the 
industrial park was completed.  To this end, Blanche Road 
installed water and sewer lines for all of the lots and 
resurfaced the roads, at a cost of approximately $300,000.  
  
Blanche Road also established a sales office, hired a park 
manager, purchased construction equipment, and began marketing 
the lots.   
 The parties' dispute centers on Blanche Road's attempts 
to obtain various building permits for lots in the industrial 
park.  Plaintiffs claim that the Township, through its 
supervisors and employees, engaged in a campaign of harassment 
designed to force  
Blanche Road to abandon its development of the industrial park.  
Defendants, on the other hand, maintain that they were applying 
the local zoning and permitting regulations in a lawful and 
reasonable manner.   
 In Bensalem Township, during the relevant time period, 
an aspiring developer of a parcel of land was required first to 
obtain the Township's approval of the subdivision plan and then 
to acquire three permits.  The first permit was a land alteration 
permit, which gave the developer the right to clear the land of 
existing vegetation and to alter the course of surface water.  In 
order to qualify for this permit, a developer had to comply with 
the Township's Land Alteration Ordinance and to show that the 
work would not cause soil erosion or excessive water flow onto 
adjoining property.  All land alteration permits were approved by 
the Township Board of Supervisors.  Next, in order to erect a 
building, a developer was required to obtain a building permit by 
verifying that the building plans were in accord with applicable 
  
building codes.  Finally, after the building was erected but 
before it could be occupied, a developer had to procure a use and 
occupancy permit, showing that the building had been constructed 
in accord with the approved plans and was safe for occupancy.  
All building permits and use and occupancy permits were approved 
by the Township Licensing and Inspections Department (L & I).     
 In 1987, Blanche Road developed, constructed, and sold 
its first lot, lot 29, without incident.  Blanche Road then 
obtained permits for, purchased, and began construction on lot 7.  
The two buildings constructed on the lot were leased to tenants.  
Blanche Road did not, however, obtain use and occupancy permits 
for the buildings before they were occupied.  Next, Blanche Road 
filed applications for a land alteration permit and a building 
permit for lot 13.  These applications were rejected in June 1987 
by the Township zoning officer, building inspector, and fire 
marshall.  At that time, Fire Marshall John Scott, who had 
rejected the building permit application, placed a note in 
Blanche Road's file, that read:  "C.W. -- S.2 -- NO SPRINKLERS -- 
CAN YOU GET THEM ON SOMETHING ELSE?"1  Eventually, Blanche Road's 
applications for permits for lot 13 were approved, and in August 
1987 Blanche Road completed its purchase of lot 13 and began 
construction. 
                     
 
   1According to plaintiffs, "C.W." stands for Cynthia Williams, 
the Township building inspector at the time; "S.2" was a building 
code classification for "low hazard" storage materials; and "No 
sprinklers" refers to the fact that, given the size of the 
building planned for lot 13, sprinklers were not required.   
  
 In October 1987, Blanche Road filed applications for 
land alteration and building permits for lots 14 and 26.  In 
November the permits for lots 14 and 26 were withheld, pending 
payment of "impact fees" of approximately $9,600 for lot 14 and 
$16,000 for lot 26.  The impact fees, imposed pursuant to the 
June 15, 1987, amendment to the Township's Subdivision and Land 
Development Ordinance, assessed commercial developers a fee of 
$.80 per square foot of proposed floor area.2  Blanche Road 
protested the imposition of the impact fees, arguing that the 
ordinance was not applicable because the Township had approved 
the industrial park's subdivision and development plan prior to 
the ordinance's enactment.  In response to Blanche Road's 
protest, Richard Moore, the Township's solicitor, "waived" the 
impact fees.  Permits for lots 14 and 26 were then issued, and 
Blanche Road began construction on them.   
 In a December 1987 meeting, however, Township 
officials, including the director of L & I, Staerk, the Township 
engineer, Scheuren, and zoning officer, Steiner, told Walter 
Czekay that, despite Moore's determination to the contrary, 
Blanche Road would be required to pay impact fees on lots 14 and 
26.  They also informed Czekay that impact fees were owed on lot 
13 and that Blanche Road would be required to establish an escrow 
account of $10,000 per lot to cover engineering fees.  According 
                     
    
2Under the ordinance, impact fees were to be paid to L & I 
upon the issuance of a building permit.   
  
to Czekay's trial testimony, Staerk told Czekay that, if Blanche 
Road failed to pay the impact fees, Staerk would take whatever 
action was necessary to stop construction at the industrial park. 
 Blanche Road refused to pay the impact fees or to 
establish an escrow account for the engineering fees.  Later that 
month, on December 22, Code Enforcement Officer William Oettinger 
issued a stop work order on construction at the Blanche Road 
site.  As of that date, Blanche Road was constructing on lots 13, 
14, and 26.  Oettinger issued the citations to Blanche Road, 
based upon violation of erosion and sedimentation control 
measures outlined in the land alteration permits.  In part, these 
citations charged violations on lots which were still owned by 
the Talackis.  A citation was also issued for land alteration 
without a permit.  In issuing the stop work order, Oettinger 
threatened that, if work did not stop at once, he would send 
police to arrest all Blanche Road representatives and workmen on 
the site.  He then wished plaintiffs' representatives a "Merry 
Christmas." 
 Plaintiffs contend that there was no basis for the stop 
work order because it was the Township's usual practice to give a 
developer ten days to correct a deficiency before issuing such an 
order.  Moreover, plaintiffs argue that the Township's building 
code authorized the issuance of stop work orders only with 
respect to "work on any building or structure . . . being 
prosecuted . . . contrary to the . . . code or in an unsafe or 
  
dangerous manner," and that no such violations were noted on the 
stop work citations.  Finally, plaintiffs point out that the 
Township's Building Inspector, Cindy Williams, had been at the 
site approximately three days prior to the issuance of the stop 
work order and had not issued any citations. 
 Blanche Road attempted to appeal the citations and the 
stop work order to the Township's Zoning Hearing Board.  The 
Township instead directed the appeal to the Code Appeals Board, 
created in July 1987.  Because the Code Appeals Board had not in 
fact been formed, the Township's Board of Supervisors quickly 
assembled a Board to hear Blanche Road's case.  On January 11, 
1988, a hearing was convened with three members of the newly 
constituted Code Appeals Board, but the Board declined to reach 
the merits of Blanche Road's appeal.  At a second hearing, on 
February 2, 1988, Blanche Road was informed that the Board would 
not entertain the appeal because the Board did not have 
jurisdiction over the matter.3 
 One month later, Scheuren returned to the Blanche Road 
site with an enforcement officer from the Bucks County 
Conservation District, the agency responsible for enforcement of 
Pennsylvania's Clean Streams Act.  The Conservation District 
officer cited Blanche Road for failing to file or to comply with 
                     
    
3Two reasons were given for the lack of jurisdiction:  the 
stop work order was based on ordinance violations rather than on 
violations of the BOCA code, and the Board members were uncertain 
about their qualifications to serve on the Board. 
  
a sedimentation and erosion plan.  The Township solicitor 
recommended that Blanche Road's permits be revoked until such 
time as compliance with state and local law was established.  On 
February 8, 1988, Oettinger served Blanche Road with a notice of 
revocation of building and land alteration permits for lots 13, 
14, and 26, as well as with a second stop work order.4 
 On February 28, 1988, Blanche Road filed a state court 
equity action seeking to enjoin revocation of its permits.  
Pursuant to a stipulation agreed to by the parties and approved 
by the court, the permit revocations were rescinded.  In June and 
July 1988, Blanche Road applied for use and occupancy permits for 
lots 13, 14, and 26; as earlier had been the case with the permit 
for lot 7, the application was altered to require an additional 
inspection and approval by engineer Scheuren. 
 When Blanche Road filed applications for land 
alteration permits for lots 12, 21, 11, 15, and 8, the Township 
treated them as subdivision and land development permit 
applications.  This treatment is significant because subdivision 
and land development applications require a more extensive review 
and are more time-consuming and costly than applications for land 
                     
    
4The permit revocation notice and second stop work order 
cited additional violations, including failure to comply with 
certain regulations promulgated under the Pennsylvania Clean 
Streams Act and failure to obtain a Use and Occupancy permit for 
lot 7, which was occupied.   
 Oettinger also filed a criminal complaint against Czekay 
personally for occupying a building on lot 7 without a use and 
occupancy permit; the complaint, however, was filed in the wrong 
district and was ultimately withdrawn. 
  
alteration permits.  Building permits for lots 12, 21, 15, and 8 
were eventually issued as "conditional" permits, containing a 
notation that the Township was not surrendering its right to 
collect impact fees on the lots.5 
 Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Blanche Road 
cites the testimony of Township Engineer Scheuren as evidence 
that the Township and its officials conspired to delay and 
ultimately to shut down Blanche Road's development of the 
industrial park.  Scheuren testified that all three Supervisor 
defendants (Ryan, Costello, and Maher) told him to review Blanche 
Road's permit applications with extra scrutiny in order to "slow 
down" the development.  According to Scheuren, Maher told him to 
prepare a "punch list" for lot 7 by looking for every possible 
violation and to proceed with whatever soil erosion violations he 
could find at the site in order to continue the stop work orders.      
  
 Plaintiffs allege that, due to the Township's 
insistence on the payment of inapplicable impact fees and to the 
Township's improper refusal to release and issue permits, the 
Talackis and the Czekays decided not to finish the project.  
Blanche Road was closed down.  
 II. 
                     
    
5Blanche Road contends that, because no one had ever 
encountered "conditional" permits before, the permits created 
problems with Blanche Road's bank and caused a potential buyer of 
lot 21 to back out of its deal. 
  
 On December 20, 1989, plaintiffs brought the instant 
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of their equal 
protection and due process rights in connection with the 
development of selected lots in the industrial park.6  In 
addition to the Township, several officials and employees of the 
Township were named as defendants, including:  the five 
Supervisors in office at the time the suit was filed (Costello, 
Francano, Maher, Ryan, and Zajac), the members of the Township 
Code Appeals Board (Nolan, Seeberger, and Walls), Township 
Manager Raddi, Zoning Officer Steiner, Director of the Department 
of Licenses and Inspections (L & I) Staerk, Code Enforcement 
Officer Oettinger, Township Engineers Scheuren and Thakuria, and 
Solicitor Toften and his associate Landis.   
 Blanche Road sought four types of damages from these 
defendants:  (1) damages resulting from the Township's delay in 
issuing permits for lots 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 25, and 26; 
(2) overhead costs and legal fees; (3) lost opportunity costs on 
lots 11 and 21, which Blanche Road unsuccessfully attempted to 
develop; and (4) lost profits which would have been earned from 
the remaining lots in the subdivision if Blanche Road had had the 
opportunity to purchase or develop them.   
                     
    
6Blanche Road's equal protection and procedural due process 
claims were dismissed during the first trial, and Blanche Road 
has not pursued those claims.  Accordingly, the only claim 
presented to the jury at the first trial and raised in the second 
trial is a violation of substantive due process. 
  
 During the first trial, the district court held as a 
matter of law that Blanche Road could not recover damages in 
connection with the lots which it never purchased and for which 
it had never applied for permits.  The court based this ruling on 
its conclusion that, in addition to being speculative, any 
damages arising from the non-optioned lots could not causally be 
linked to defendants since defendants had never had the 
opportunity to act on any permits in connection with the lots.  
In accordance with the court's ruling, Blanche Road was precluded 
from submitting evidence of any damages suffered in connection 
with the non-optioned lots. 
 At the close of plaintiffs' case in the first trial, 
the district court granted judgment as a matter of law in favor 
of defendants Staerk, Toften, Francano, Zajac, and Raddi, on the 
basis of insufficient evidence.7  Therefore, due to the earlier 
dismissal of several other defendants from the case,8 Blanche 
Road's substantive due process claims proceeded to trial against 
the following defendants:  the Township; Supervisors Costello, 
Ryan, and Maher; Township Engineers Scheuren and Thakuria; and 
Code Enforcement Officer Oettinger. 
                     
    
7Blanche Road appeals this ruling only insofar as it applies 
to Staerk. 
    
8Defendants Steiner and Landis were previously dismissed by 
stipulation.  In addition, the claims against defendants Walls, 
Seeberger, and Nolan (members of the Code Appeals Board) were 
dismissed on summary judgment.  Blanche Road does not appeal as 
to any of these defendants.  
  
 At the end of the first trial, the jury returned a 
verdict for plaintiffs, with special interrogatories finding that 
(1) Blanche Road's substantive due process rights had been 
violated, (2) the remaining defendants were responsible for this 
violation, and (3) defendants Costello, Ryan, and Maher had 
participated in a conspiracy to violate Blanche Road's rights.  
The jury also found that Blanche Road was entitled to total 
compensatory damages of $2 million, of which defendants Costello, 
Ryan, and Maher were liable for $500,000 each, and defendants 
Scheuren, Thakuria, and Oettinger were liable for $165,000 each.9  
At the time of the verdict, the district court noted that the sum 
of the individual compensatory damages award fell short of the 
total compensatory damages award of $2 million and also that the 
jury had not specified the amount of damages for which the 
Township was liable.  The court offered to ask the jury an 
additional question regarding the Township's liability, but 
counsel for both sides agreed that the court should simply make 
an appropriate finding based upon the verdict.  The district 
court then awarded damages against the Township in the amount of 
$1,500,000, representing the compensatory damages awards against 
the three Supervisor defendants.  The court explained that it did 
not hold the Township liable for the damages assessed against 
                     
    
9The jury also found that the individual defendants were 
liable for punitive damages in the following amounts:  Costello, 
Ryan, and Maher were liable for $2.00 each; Scheuren, Thakuria, 
and Oettinger were liable for $1.00 each. 
  
Oettinger, Scheuren, and Thakuria because the jury had found that 
those defendants did not conspire with the Supervisors to violate 
Blanche Road's rights. 
 Following the trial and the verdict, the Township, the 
Supervisor defendants, and Oettinger all moved for judgment as a 
matter of law under Rule 50, Fed. R. Civ. P., or for a new 
trial.10  The district court denied the Township and the 
Supervisor defendants' motions, holding that there was sufficient 
evidence to support the jury verdicts against them.  The court 
granted these defendants' motion for a new trial, however, on the 
basis that plaintiffs' counsel had "pursued a pattern of 
misconduct from opening statement through final argument" that 
led to the introduction of inadmissible and prejudicial 
information before the jury.  The court found that there was a 
"reasonable probability that the jury's findings were influenced 
by Plaintiffs' counsel's highly improper conduct, to the unfair 
prejudice of the moving Defendants."  Blanche Road Corp. v. 
Bensalem Township, No. 89-9040, mem. order at 2 (Aug. 26, 1993).  
The district court also granted Oettinger's motion for judgment 
as a matter of law, finding that the evidence did not show that 
he had acted with an improper motive or bad faith.  Id.  In the 
event that judgment for Oettinger was reversed on appeal, the 
district court granted him a new trial for the same reason it had 
                     
    
10Defendants Scheuren and Thakuria have not challenged the 
judgments against them and are not part of the instant appeal. 
  
granted a new trial for the Township and the Supervisor 
defendants.  Id. 
 During the second trial, plaintiffs moved for recusal 
of the district court judge, who had presided over the case from 
the beginning.  Blanche Road's motion was based upon the district 
judge's manner in questioning some of plaintiffs' witnesses.  The 
judge denied the motion, and the trial continued. 
 At the close of plaintiffs' case in the second trial, 
the district court granted the remaining defendants' motions for 
judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a), Fed. R. Civ. P., 
and dismissed the case by final order entered on March 2, 1994.  
 III. 
 The district court had jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.  This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, as the instant appeal 
and cross-appeal follow from a final judgment entered by the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania.   
 IV. 
 In this appeal, plaintiffs challenge several decisions 
made by the district court over the course of both trials.11  
Specifically, in connection with the first trial, plaintiffs 
                     
    
11Defendants also raise issues pertaining to both trials on 
cross-appeal.  To the extent that these issues are not dealt with 
by our remand of this case for a new trial, we resolve them in 
Section VI.B., supra. 
  
challenge:  (1) the district court's grant of defendants Staerk 
and Oettinger's Rule 50 motions, (2) the district court's grant 
of a new trial, (3) the district court's decision barring 
plaintiffs from presenting damages evidence pertaining to the 
subdivision lots that plaintiffs never attempted to purchase, and 
(4) the district court's molding of the verdict in response to 
the jury's answers to special interrogatories.  Plaintiffs also 
challenge the district court's decisions in the second trial to 
deny plaintiffs' motion for recusal and to dismiss plaintiffs' 
claims against the remaining defendants. 
 V. 
 A. 
 Turning our attention to the issues arising from the 
first trial, we find that the district court did not err in 
granting the  Rule 50 motions on behalf of Staerk and Oettinger.  
A Rule 50(a) directed verdict may be granted if, construing all 
the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the party 
opposing the motion, the court finds as a matter of law that no 
jury could decide in favor of the nonmoving party.  In reviewing 
the district court's grant of the Rule 50 motions, we exercise 
plenary review.  See Indian Coffee Corporation v. Proctor & 
Gamble, Co., 752 F.2d 891, 894 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 At the close of plaintiffs' case, the only evidence 
which had involved Staerk was testimony that Staerk directed 
Walter Czekay to pay the impact fees and that he threatened to 
  
shut down the development if the fees were not paid.  This 
evidence was insufficient to support a finding that Staerk 
violated plaintiffs' civil rights.  In order to demonstrate that 
Staerk, as a government agent, violated plaintiffs' civil rights, 
plaintiffs would have had to show either that (1) Staerk's 
actions were not rationally related to a legitimate government 
interest; or (2) that Staerk's actions were "in fact motivated by 
bias, bad faith or improper motive."  Parkway Garage v. 
Philadelphia, 5 F.3d 685, 692 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Midnight 
Sessions, Ltd. v. Philadelphia, 945 F.2d 667, 683 (3d Cir. 1991), 
cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1668 (1992)).  Clearly, Staerk's demand 
that plaintiffs pay impact fees required by a county ordinance is 
rationally related to a legitimate government interest.  
Plaintiffs, therefore, were required to demonstrate that Staerk's 
actions were motivated by bias, bad faith or improper motive.  
Had plaintiffs presented additional evidence indicating that 
Staerk attempted to collect the impact fees for an improper 
reason, their civil rights claim against Staerk could have 
survived a motion for judgment as a matter of law.  Because 
plaintiffs failed to present any such evidence, however, the 
district court did not err in granting judgment in favor of 
defendants on plaintiffs' claims against Staerk. 
 Plaintiffs' argument that Staerk should be liable under 
a theory of supervisor liability also fails.  It is well settled 
that the doctrine of respondeat superior may not be employed to 
  
impose § 1983 liability on a supervisor for the conduct of a 
subordinate which violates a citizen's constitutional rights.  
Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).  
Instead, in order to establish Staerk's liability for the actions 
of Oettinger, his subordinate, plaintiffs were required to 
produce evidence first that Oettinger's conduct violated 
plaintiffs' constitutional rights and second that Staerk knew of 
Oettinger's conduct and approved it.  See St. Louis v. 
Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988); Kernats v. O'Sullivan, 35 F.3d 
1171, 1182 (7th Cir. 1994).  Because plaintiffs satisfied neither 
requirement, the district court properly granted Staerk's Rule 50 
motion. 
 Furthermore, we conclude that the district court 
properly granted judgment as a matter of law on plaintiffs' 
claims against Oettinger.  This ruling followed the jury's 
verdict, which found that Oettinger was not involved in the 
conspiracy to violate plaintiffs' constitutional rights.  The 
district court reasoned that, without the actions of the co-
conspirators being charged to him, insufficient evidence existed 
to establish bad faith or improper motive on the part of 
Oettinger.   Citing Winn v. Lynn, 941 F.2d 236 (3d Cir. 1991), 
the district court held that Oettinger fell into the category of 
government officials performing discretionary functions whose 
conduct "does not violate clearly established statutory or 
  
constitutional rights which a reasonable person would have 
known."  Id. at 239.   
 Plaintiffs take issue with this conclusion, arguing 
that Oettinger did manifest bad faith by wishing Czekay and 
others a "Merry Christmas," after issuing the first stop work 
order, and by filing a criminal complaint against Czekay for 
occupying a building on lot 7 without an occupancy permit.12  
Neither of these actions, however, unpleasant as they may be, 
rise to the level of bad faith required to support a § 1983 
violation.  Nor, in view of the jury finding that Oettinger was 
not a part of the conspiracy, can these actions be considered to 
have been taken by Oettinger as a part of the overall conspiracy.  
Moreover, it is undisputed that erosion and sedimentation control 
violations did exist in the industrial park area when the stop 
work orders were issued.  Plaintiffs in essence failed to prove 
that Oettinger had the motivation or bad faith required if there 
is to be a finding that he committed a substantive due process 
violation.  See Parkway Garage, 5 F.3d at 692.  Accordingly, the 
case against Oettinger was properly dismissed by the district 
court. 
 B. 
                     
    
12Czekay was not in fact an occupant of the lot 7 building.  
The building was, however, being occupied without a permit.  As 
we note infra in footnote 4, this complaint against Czekay was 
ultimately withdrawn. 
  
 The next question arising from the first trial is 
whether the district court properly granted defendants' motion 
for a new trial.  As noted in Olefins Trading v. Han Yang Chem 
Corp., 9 F.3d 282, 290 (3d Cir. 1993), this Court applies a 
deferential "abuse of discretion" standard when reviewing a trial 
court's grant of a new trial motion.  Specifically, in cases 
involving counsel misconduct, we defer to the trial court's 
assessment of the level of prejudice involved "because the trial 
judge was present and able to judge the impact of counsel's 
remarks."  Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., 980 F.2d 171, 207 
(3d Cir. 1992). 
 In its Memorandum Order of August 24, 1993, the 
district court, after expressly stating that the jury's verdict 
was supported by the weight of the evidence when viewed in the 
light most favorable to plaintiffs, granted defendants' motion 
for a new trial on the ground of counsel misconduct.  The Court 
reasoned: 
 
[T]he record reveals that counsel for Plaintiffs 
pursued a pattern of misconduct from opening statement 
through final argument.  Unfortunately, Plaintiffs' 
counsel was able to get before the jury information 
that was inadmissible as evidence and clearly unfairly 
prejudicial to moving defendants.  Counsel's pattern of 
conduct is probative of his belief that such misconduct 
was necessary to the success of Plaintiffs' case.  I am 
convinced beyond any doubt that there is a reasonable 
probability that the jury's findings were influenced by 
Plaintiffs' counsel's highly improper conduct, to the 
unfair prejudice of the moving Defendants.  Moreover, 
cautionary instructions could not and did not cure the 
unfair prejudice.  I must grant a new trial not as 
  
punishment to Plaintiffs' counsel, but to assure 
fairness and due process to moving defendants. 
Blanche Road Corp. v. Bensalem Township, No. 89-9040, slip op. at 
2 (E.D.Pa. Aug. 24, 1993) (footnote omitted).  Thus, the district 
court's decision to grant defendants a new trial was based upon 
the court's determination that plaintiffs' counsel had engaged in 
misconduct that had in all probability influenced the jury. 
 In this circuit, the test for determining whether to 
grant a new trial in cases involving counsel misconduct is 
"whether the improper assertions have made it 'reasonably 
probable' that the verdict was influenced by prejudicial 
statements."  Greate Bay Hotel & Casino v. Tose, 34 F.3d 1227, 
1236 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., 
980 F.2d 171, 207 (3d Cir. 1992)).  In the instant case, it is 
clear that the district court did not abuse its discretion by 
finding that this standard was met; the record is replete with 
examples of counsel misconduct that might have influenced the 
jury.  For example, counsel repeatedly argued with the court 
regarding its rulings, see, e.g., Joint Appendix (J.A.) 212, 251, 
868, even going so far as to inform the court, in the presence of 
the jury, that it was not treating counsel or his client fairly.  
J.A. 373, 869.  Counsel also commented before the jury, based on 
the cross-examination of his witness, Walter Czekay, that Czekay 
had "answered honestly, candidly, accurately.  His testimony is 
excellent."  J.A. 1083.  In addition, counsel in his closing 
argument referred to backdated documents, for which no evidence 
  
existed in the record; he argued that Costello, Ryan, and Maher 
had told Scheuren "to backdate some documents and then they watch 
him go to jail."  J.A. 3051.  This short list is representative 
of the type of counsel misconduct that permeated the first trial.  
The district court's decision to grant a new trial on this basis 
was not an abuse of discretion. 
 C. 
 The next issue raised in connection with the first 
trial is the district court's decision to mold the verdict to 
conform with the jury's responses to special interrogatories.  
This issue is rendered moot, however, in light of our decision to 
affirm the district court's grant of the second trial. 
 D. 
 Finally, plaintiffs contend that the district court 
erred in holding as a matter of law during the first trial that 
Blanche Road could not recover damages in connection with the 
lots that it had never purchased and for which it had never 
applied for permits.  The court based its ruling on its 
conclusion that, in addition to being speculative, any damages 
arising from the non-optioned lots could not be causally linked 
to defendants since defendants never had the opportunity to act 
on any permits in connection with the lots. (J.A. 812-14). 
 Section 1983 "creates 'a species of tort liability in 
favor of persons who are deprived of rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured to them by the Constitution.'"  Memphis 
  
Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305-06 (1986) 
(quoting from Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253 (1978) (internal 
quotation and citation omitted)).  Damages in § 1983 "cases are 
designed to provide 'compensation for the injury caused plaintiff 
by defendant's breach of duty.'"  Id. at 306 (quoting from 2 F. 
Harper, F. James, & O. Gray, Law of Torts § 25.1 (2d ed. 1986)).  
"To that end, compensatory damages may include [both] out-of-
pocket loss and other monetary harms," as well as more intangible 
injuries, resulting from the breach.  Id. at 307. 
 "The level of damages [in a § 1983 case] is ordinarily 
determined according to principles derived from the common law of 
torts."  Id. at 306 (emphasis supplied).  That common law is 
reflected in the law of Pennsylvania.  Under Pennsylvania law, 
speculative damages may not be awarded.  Damages are considered 
speculative if "the uncertainty concerns the fact of damages, not 
the amount."  See Carroll v. Philadelphia Housing Auth., 650 A.2d 
1097 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994).  Consequently, damages are not 
considered speculative merely because they are not capable of 
exact calculation.  See Ashcraft v. C.G. Hussey & Co., 359 Pa. 
129, 58 A.2d 170 (1948).  Rather, Pennsylvania law merely 
requires that plaintiffs present a reasonable quantity of 
information from which a jury can fairly estimate the damages.  
Id.   
 In the instant case, plaintiffs met this burden.   
Plaintiffs established that, as of 1986, plaintiffs had an option 
  
to purchase and develop 23 lots in the Blanche Road subdivision.  
In reliance on this option, plaintiffs invested $300,000 in road 
improvements and water and sewer lines which benefited the whole 
industrial park.  Furthermore, plaintiffs showed that, two years 
later, they abandoned their attempt to develop the industrial 
park.  They contend that the premature termination of the project 
was caused by defendants' deliberate interference and delay. 
 The district court dismissed the claim on ripeness 
grounds:  the options to purchase had not been exercised and no 
permits had been sought for these lots.  As we will discuss more 
fully below in Section VI.B., under plaintiffs' theory that 
defendants' deliberate delay caused their loss, plaintiffs need 
not wait for the exercise of the options or the completion of the 
permitting process before bringing suit.  We conclude that the 
district court erred in precluding plaintiffs from pursuing their 
claim for recovery of damages resulting from their alleged 
inability to develop lots that they never purchased.  
Nevertheless, plaintiffs will still bear the burden of proving 
causation and of offering sufficient evidence of loss to 
demonstrate that these damages can reasonably be calculated and 
consequently are not unduly speculative. 
 VI. 
 Two issues arise on the appeal from the second trial.  
First, plaintiffs challenge the district judge's decision not to 
recuse himself from the second trial.  Second, plaintiffs 
  
challenge the district court's granting of judgment as a matter 
of law on all claims against the remaining defendants. 
 A. 
 In reviewing a judge's decision not to recuse himself, 
our standard of review is abuse of discretion.  See Edelstein v. 
Wilentz, 812 F.2d 128, 131 (3d Cir. 1987).   
 Plaintiffs' argument for recusal in this case focuses 
on the district judge's comments, both before the jury and at 
sidebar, indicating his distrust toward and frustration with 
plaintiffs and plaintiffs' counsel.  These comments include the 
court's suggestion that plaintiffs' counsel had somehow 
"maneuvered" to ensure Scheuren's appearance as a witness, J.A. 
4217, and the court's declaration that plaintiffs' counsel 
conducted the worst direct examination the court had ever seen.  
J.A. 273.  The district judge was also skeptical of plaintiffs' 
witnesses, as reflected in his extensive questioning of them and 
his comment during argument on the motion to recuse that Czekay 
"doesn't have any right to say things which are not true 
initially and hope that it doesn't get clarified either by cross-
examination or the Court."  J.A. 4455. 
    Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), recusal is required whenever 
a judge's impartiality "might reasonably be questioned."  
Accordingly, a judge should recuse himself where "a reasonable 
man knowing all the circumstances would harbor doubts concerning 
the judge's impartiality."  United States v. Dalfonso, 707 F.2d 
  
757, 760 (3d Cir. 1983); see also Alexander v. Primerica 
Holdings, 10 F.3d 155 (3d Cir. 1993) (ordering the reassignment 
of a case because the judge's impartiality could reasonably be 
questioned). 
 We recently interpreted the standard of "impartiality" 
required under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) in United States v. Bertoli, 40 
F.3d 1384 (3d Cir. 1994).  Citing Liteky v. United States, 114 S. 
Ct. 1147 (1994), we stated that the "extrajudicial source" 
doctrine arising under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1)13 also applies to § 
455(a).  Under the "extrajudicial source" doctrine, "bias, in 
order to form the basis for recusal, must stem from a source 
outside of the official proceedings."  Bertoli, 40 F.3d at 1412.  
Consequently, because the source of the bias must be an external 
source, "judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are 
critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the 
parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or 
partiality challenge."  Id. (citing Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1157).   
 Despite this external source requirement, recusal may 
still be required if the judge's actions during the trial, 
considered objectively, "display a deep-seated favoritism or 
antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible."  Bertoli, 
40 F.3d at 1412; see also United States v. Antar, Nos. 94-5228 
and 94-5230, slip op. at 7-20 (3d Cir. Apr. 12, 1995) (requiring 
                     
    
13Section 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) requires disqualification 
when the judge "has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a 
party." 
  
recusal after the judge explicitly revealed having an improper 
goal in the proceeding).  After reviewing the record in this 
case, however, we do not find that the district judge's actions 
demonstrated the type of bias warranting his recusal from the 
case.  Although it is true that at times the judge criticized 
plaintiffs for attempting to mislead the jury and became short-
tempered with plaintiffs' counsel, these comments appear to arise 
from the judge's impatience and frustration with the manner in 
which plaintiffs were trying their case, rather than any 
partiality for defendants.  As Justice Scalia wrote in Liteky: 
 
Not establishing bias or partiality, however, are 
expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, 
and even anger, that are within the bounds of what 
imperfect men and women, even after having been 
confirmed as federal judges, sometimes display.  A 
judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom administration--
even a stern and short-tempered judge's ordinary 
efforts at courtroom administration--remain immune. 
114 S. Ct. at 1157.  Accordingly, because the district judge's 
actions and comments did not manifest a deep-seated bias that 
would render fair judgment impossible, we find that he did not 
abuse his discretion in not recusing himself from the second 
trial. 
 B.           
 The second issue from the second trial is the district 
court's granting of judgment as a matter of law to defendants 
after the completion of the plaintiffs' case.  A Rule 50(a) 
directed verdict may be granted only if, as a matter of law, 
  
viewing all the evidence which has been tendered and should have 
been admitted in the light most favorable to the party opposing 
the motion, no jury could decide in that party's favor.  Our 
review of the grant of such a motion is plenary.  See Indian 
Coffee Corp. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 752 F.2d 891, 894 (3d Cir. 
1985).   
 In granting defendants' Rule 50(a) motion, the district 
court made the following conclusions of law: 
 
[T]here are certain things which are absolutely 
undisputed on record.  That is, that Blanche Road did, 
in fact, apply for a number of permits . . . . Except 
for one, . . . Blanche Road had approval of the permits 
and proceeded to build pursuant to the permits on all 
except lots 21 and 11. 
 
. . . . 
 
 As was noted by Judge Scirica in Acierno, the 
property owner has a high burden of proving that a 
final decision has been reached by the agency before it 
may seek compensatory or injunctive relief in federal 
court on federal constitutional grounds.  No such 
showing of such final decision has been made in regard 
to those lots . . . on which Blanche Road did not 
exercise its option to become owner, upon which Blanche 
Road never applied for a permit; and therefore, 
obviously there's no ripeness as to those. 
 
. . . . 
 
 As to the lots for which Blanche Road applied for 
permits, they would fall within a separate category.  
As to those, I read the cases, including Acierno, as 
limiting substantive due process violations to mature 
constitutional claims, which conclusively bar the use 
of the property. 
 
 There is no such conclusive bar here as to any of 
the properties.  And, in fact, they had been utilized 
  
with the exception of lots 21 and 11, which apparently 
have not as yet been constructed. 
 
. . . . 
 
 As to lot 11, plaintiff has offered into evidence 
. . . a notice of rejection of application for permit.  
 
 . . . While there is this evidence of a rejection, 
the record is devoid of any attempt . . . to appeal 
that to the zoning board for final determination. 
 
 I read the zoning regulations as giving 
jurisdiction to the zoning hearing board in such cases, 
and, therefore, I find . . . that the controversy over 
lot 11 has not developed into a mature constitutional 
claim, and must dismiss it because of ripeness. 
(J.A. 5217-5222).   
 Thus, in granting defendants' Rule 50(a) motion, the 
court applied the standards applicable in zoning cases, such as 
Acierno v. Mitchell, 6 F.3d 970 (3d Cir. 1993), to the instant 
case.  For the reasons that follow, however, the ripeness 
requirement arising in zoning dispute cases does not apply to 
Blanche Road's claims and, consequently, defendants' Rule 50(a) 
motion should not have been granted. 
 In Acierno, the plaintiff challenged the county's 
denial of his application for a building permit.  We held that 
the plaintiff's claim was unripe because, although his 
application had been rejected by the county's Development and 
Licensing Division, he had failed to appeal the decision to the 
county's Board of Adjustment, which had final authority to 
interpret the zoning regulations.  Accordingly, plaintiff did not 
have a "final decision" from the county until the Board of 
  
Adjustment rendered its decision on his permit application.  See 
also Midnight Sessions, Ltd. v. Philadelphia, 945 F.2d 667, 686 
(3d Cir. 1991) ("This failure to appeal precludes 'final 
administrative action' by the City and, therefore, these claims 
were premature . . . ."). 
 In the instant case, however, plaintiffs' claims are 
not dependent on a final decision from the county, since 
plaintiffs are not appealing from an adverse decision on a permit 
application.14  Rather, plaintiffs are asserting that defendants, 
acting in their capacity as officers of the Township, 
deliberately and improperly interfered with the process by which 
the Township issued permits, in order to block or to delay the 
issuance of plaintiffs' permits, and that defendants did so for 
reasons unrelated to the merits of the application for the 
permits.  Such actions, if proven, are sufficient to establish a 
substantive due process violation, actionable under § 1983, even 
if the ultimate outcome of plaintiffs' permit applications was 
favorable.15  See Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d 1124, 1128-30 (3d 
Cir. 1988) (factfinder could conclude that council members, 
acting in their official capacity, improperly interfered with 
                     
    
14In fact, virtually all of plaintiffs' permit applications 
were ultimately approved. 
 
    
15For this reason, we reject defendants' argument that 
Blanche Road failed to assert a constitutional claim because it 
had no vested property right that could be subject to a due 
process violation.  Plaintiffs had the right to be free from 
harassment in their land development efforts. 
  
building permit process for partisan political or personal 
reasons unrelated to the merits of the permit applications).  
This is a substantively different type of claim than that 
presented in the ripeness cases, and internal review of the 
individual permit decisions is thus unnecessary to render such a 
claim ripe. 
 The district court also erred in ruling that 
plaintiffs' use of their property had to be "conclusively barred" 
in order for plaintiffs to state a claim.  We have previously 
held that, in order to prevail on a takings claim, a plaintiff 
must establish that its intended use of its property was 
"conclusively barred" by the disputed land use regulation.  See 
Pace Resources, Inc. v. Shrewsbury Township, 808 F.2d 1023, 1029 
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 906 (1987).  In the instant 
case, however, plaintiffs are not claiming that their property 
was unconstitutionally taken for a governmental purpose without 
just compensation.  Rather, plaintiffs claim that defendants 
acted deliberately and under color of state law to deprive them 
of their property rights by interfering in and delaying the 
issuance of permits.   Accordingly, the district court, by 
relying on the ripeness standard set forth in Acierno and the 
"conclusively barred" standard set forth in Pace Resources, 
applied the wrong legal standard in granting defendants' Rule 
50(a) motion. 
  
 The question remains, however, whether defendants' Rule 
50(a) motion should be granted if the proper legal standard were 
applied.  Defendants posit two arguments to support their 
contention that, viewing all the evidence in the light most 
favorable to plaintiffs, no jury could find in plaintiffs' favor.  
First, defendants argue that, under Pennsylvania's "deemed 
approval" statute, 53 Pa. C.S.A. § 4104, plaintiffs cannot 
establish damages arising from any delays in the issuance of 
their permits.  Under the statute, if a municipality does not 
approve or reject a permit application within 90 days, the 
application is deemed approved.  Plaintiffs either were granted 
permits within the 90 day period or they did not take legal steps 
to force the issuance of the permit after the expiration of the 
90 days.  The "deemed approved" statute, however, does not 
foreclose damages based upon intentional delays in the issuance 
of permits.  One need only consider a hypothetical situation in 
which officials, seeking to sabotage a developer's project, 
intentionally withheld each permit for 89 days or for an even 
longer period until the applicant would take legal steps.  Such 
deliberate and arbitrary delays could cause significant 
additional expense to the developer.   
 Next, the Supervisor defendants contend that their Rule 
50(a) motion should be upheld on the alternative ground that they 
were entitled to qualified immunity.  Comparing the instant case 
to Acierno v. Cloutier, 40 F.3d 597 (3d Cir. 1994) ("Acierno 
  
II"), the supervisor defendants assert that, because Pennsylvania 
law is unclear as to whether a landowner's subdivision approval 
renders him immune from subsequent zoning amendments, the 
Supervisors should be entitled to immunity for their decision to 
treat plaintiffs' land alteration permit applications as land 
development permit applications and for their decision to assess 
the impact tax on the property.  Furthermore, the Supervisor 
defendants assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity 
for any personal involvement they might have had in the stop work 
orders and permit revocations issued for lots 13, 14 and 26, 
because there was a perceived threat to public health, safety, 
and welfare. 
 The test for determining whether government officials 
are entitled to qualified immunity for their actions, as set 
forth in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), is that 
"government officials performing discretionary functions 
generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar 
as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory 
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known."  Id. at 818.  In the instant case, however, when the 
evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, it 
is clear that defendants could not have reasonably believed that 
their conduct did not violate defendants' rights.  If defendants, 
for reasons unrelated to an appropriate governmental purpose, 
intentionally conspired to impede the development of the Blanche 
  
Road project, by ordering that Blanche Road's applications be 
reviewed with greater scrutiny in order to slow down the 
development and by ordering that efforts be taken to shut down 
the development, such an arbitrary abuse of governmental power 
would clearly exceed the scope of qualified immunity.  
Accordingly, the defense of qualified immunity is not available 
to defendants in the instant matter.16 
 VII. 
 For the above stated reasons, we will vacate the 
district court's order, granting defendants' Rule 50(a) motion, 
and we will order a new trial in this matter.  On retrial, the 
plaintiffs may present evidence of loss suffered from their 
inability to develop the lots, which they did not purchase and 
                     
 
    
16The Township has cross-appealed on the ground that there 
was insufficient evidence from which a jury could find a Township 
policy based upon a custom of tolerating or sanctioning conduct 
that violated plaintiffs' rights.  Our review, however, convinces 
us that the plaintiffs' evidence was sufficient for a jury to 
conclude that Township Supervisors Costello, Ryan, and Maher all 
conspired to shut down the Blanche Road development.   
       Under § 1983, "a plaintiff must show that an official who 
has the power to make policy is responsible for either the 
affirmative proclamation of a policy or acquiescence in a well-
settled custom."  Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d 
Cir. 1990) (citing Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 
1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990)).  In determining whether an official 
holds such policymaking authority, courts are to consider whether 
an official has "final, unreviewable discretion to make a 
decision or take an action."  Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1481.  In the 
instant case, the Supervisor defendants had clear authority to 
execute final, nonreviewable actions, as evidenced by their 
control over the licensing process in the Township.  Accordingly, 
plaintiffs' evidence, if believed, is sufficient to establish 
Township liability under § 1983. 
  
for which no permits were sought, if they can establish a causal 
link between such loss and the defendants' actions and if they 
can present a basis, which is not unduly speculative, for 
calculating such loss. 
 
